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Abstract 
The Custom and Border Protection (CBP) border security policy was explicitly 
presented by former Acting Commissioner of CBP, David Aguilar, in testimony 
before the United States Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee (HSGAC) on April 4, 2017 in testimony on the subject of “Fencing 
Along the Southwest Border.” Important for discussion here are the key compo-
nents of the DHS/CBP/Border Patrol’s strategy, or sets of policies, laying forth 
elements of the border walls (including barriers, fences), personnel, and technolo-
gy in order to hinder, or intercept, undocumented migrants (homo sacer) from 
entering the United States illegally—all socially constructed. Aguilar notes in his 
opening remarks “Maintaining a safe and secure environment along the U.S.—
Mexico border is critical. A safe and orderly border that is predicated on the 
strong rule of law deprives criminal organizations, drug cartels, and criminal indi-
viduals the opportunity to thrive.” In Aguilar’s testimony, when pressed by Rank-
ing Member Senator Claire McCaskill, he set forth the current needs for 
CBP/Border Patrol priority of the three elements in the following order: (1) Tech-
nology (border surveillance), (2) Personnel (numbers of agents along the border), 
and, (3) The Border Wall (physical infrastructure: fences, walls, and vehicle barri-
ers). The security apparatus affects dwellers along the Rio Grande and undocu-
mented border crossers, demonstrated here with an analysis of the application of 
President Trump’s Zero Tolerance policy (April 6–June 20, 2018). The security 
framework applied in this paper will consist of theoretical approaches assessing 
border surveillance as a panopticon, the use of Border Patrol agents for appre-
hending, detaining and removing homo sacer, and the symbolism of the bor-
der wall as a spectacle and simulacrum—all understood in the pursuit of USA 
border security policy. 
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1. Introduction and background 
This paper analyzes three key elements of the Custom and Border Protection’s 
(CBP) tripartite strategy for the border security apparatus—surveillance infra-
structure (e.g. the panopticon array of observation equipment), personnel (e.g. 
boots on the ground), and border infrastructure (e.g. fences, walls, and barriers)—
used to restrict access into the USA from its southwest border with Mexico. Addi-
tionally, President Trump’s “zero tolerance” of migrants crossing into the USA 
from the border with Mexico will be examined in the context of analyzing the 
CBP’s and Border Patrol’s (BP) implementation of the policy. Former Acting 
CBP Commissioner Aguilar’s testimony (HSGAC, April 4, 2017) provides the 
framework that may be used for a critical policy analysis in which the three ele-
ments of border security policy may be assessed. Executives and managers of 
agencies such as CBP tell stories, including through testimony, which yield valua-
ble insights into agency conduct that is as valid as any scientific inquiry (Boje, 
1991, 1995; Hummel, 1991). This paper will be examining each of the three ele-
ments, investigating the effectiveness of the CBP/BP’s border security policy 
implementation. For the technology aspect of the policy, the paper employs the 
panopticon concept based primarily on Jeremy Bentham (1787/1995) and Michel 
Foucault’s (1977) theoretical insights on surveillance (cf. also Sementelli, 2012). 
For a critical examination of the effectiveness of CBP and BP along the border, 
this work analyzes the ability, legitimacy and the justification of the agents to keep 
out the “Others,” (e.g. undocumented border crossers, drug and human traffickers, 
and terrorists) using Giorgio Agamben’s (1995, 2005) concepts of homo sacer and 
the state of exception. For the third aspect—the border wall—the paper utilizes 
a semiotic concept based on Jean Baudrillard’s (1981/2006) simulacrum insofar as 
ascertaining what the wall means, or represents symbolically, to users and those 
“Others” affected by its presence as a security, or insecurity, apparatus. Addition-
ally, Guy Debord’s (1967/1995) concept of the society of the spectacle combined 
with Douglas Kellner’s (2016) interpretation with regard to President Donald 
Trump will be employed to assess the border wall and resultant security apparatus 
especially along the Texas-Mexico border, which is primarily the Rio Grande. 
Border dwellers and undocumented crossers are also affected. In sum, the objec-
tive of the paper will be to develop a critical policy analysis of the effects of the 
current border security policy implemented by CBP and BP through and up to 
the Trump administration. 
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Border security in the USA has been around since the beginning of the repub-
lic but has relatively recently gained more attention especially since the al Qaeda 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9-11). Major fencing projects 
began during the Clinton administration under Operation Gate Keeper in 1994 
where the first major stretch of border fence was built on the California—Mexico 
border (Emmott, October 2, 2009) primarily to curb immigration and stop illegal 
drugs from entering the USA, also adversely affecting human rights (Dunn, 2001). 
The terrorist attack of 9-11 brought about an extension of the border fence (or 
wall) through Bush administration initiatives—the Secure Fence Act of 2006 and 
the REAL ID Act of 2005—to about 670 miles (1078 kilometers) across the entire 
length of the 1,954 mile (3,145 kilometers) Mexico-USA border (Garrett & Stor-
beck, 2011). These projects provide the support for increased technological sur-
veillance, border walls and apparatuses, as well as more boots on the ground—
CBP and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel. 
The latest border security policy initiative known as “Zero Tolerance” was 
announced officially by President Trump in April 2018. From April 19 to May 31, 
2018 DHS separated 1,940 children from migrants crossing into the USA (Davis, 
June 15, 2018). The new policy is ostensibly designed to detour migrants attempt-
ing to cross the Mexico-USA border as a warning using all aspects of the CBP’s 
Tripartite border security policy. The Zero Tolerance policy for migrants will be 
assessed as it pertains to Border Patrol and border security apparatus. 
2. The border security spectacle: Trump’s wall and DHS 
The building of President Trump’s “big, beautiful wall” (Soboroff & Edelman, 
October 23, 2017) would be a monumental task simply due to the logistics. USA 
Today in September 2017 conducted an extensive analysis concerning the implica-
tions for the border wall project to the USA public as to the consequences that 
would likely occur if constructed. A portion of the news article is presented here 
as it pertains to the Mexico-USA border… 
In Texas, any new wall would have to be built some distance from the border, 
because the line itself runs down the middle of the Rio Grande. To gauge the 
possible impact, the USA TODAY NETWORK used the state’s open-records 
law to obtain digital property maps from all 13 Texas counties with border 
frontage. (A 14th county touches the border only at one point, accounting for 
a single parcel.) All told, a network analysis shows, about 4,900 parcels of prop-
erty sit within 500 feet of the border in Texas […]. Most Texas land is privately 
owned, a fact that could complicate and delay efforts to build a wall in a state 
that reveres private property rights […]. There is no public map of exactly 
where, or for how far, a future border wall would run. Some of the wall would 
surely be on land already owned by the federal government, such as levees. But 
the 4,900-parcel swath gives a sense of the massive land seizure and cost that the 
federal government could face. (Ryman et al., September 2017, para. 1–4; em-
phasis added; capitalizations by the authors) 
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The proposed border wall public works project is a massive undertaking and 
will have mostly adverse effects on people dwelling along the Mexico-USA bor-
der. The political, legal, economic, social, and environmental consequences that 
will occur if the project is passed into law will have changed the landscape archi-
tecture and most likely will restrict the rights of USA citizens living in the area as 
well as any border crossers. 
The wall along US border with Mexico is a combination of paramilitary gov-
ernmental authorities (e.g. CBP, BP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
[ICE], other DHS agencies) electronic surveillance and 18-foot high fence built 
beyond what was built before in previous administrations (e.g. Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush) with the ultimate goal near absolute security—and was a cam-
paign promise by presidential candidate Donald J. Trump. Trump, since his elec-
tion in 2016 prefers to bypass most conventional media, using mostly social media 
such as twitter to achieve the ideal of complete control of communication between 
himself and his constituents without conventional media intervention… 
I use Social Media not because I like to, but because it is the only way to fight 
a VERY dishonest and unfair “press,” now often referred to as Fake News Me-
dia. Phony and non-existent “sources” are being used more often than ever. 
Many stories & reports a pure fiction! (2:36 PM, 30 Dec 2017) 
Twitter is one of Trump’s primary means to send his messages on border se-
curity and the wall, circumventing media and governmental institutions, including 
his White House office, to generate support for policies and programs from his 
followers. The media spectacle (Kellner, 2003, 2016) Trump creates pushes his 
political agenda to build his wall and increase the number of additional border 
patrol agents by up to 5,000, even though the USA Government’s DHS has to 
spend $297 million to help CBP get them as “Congress requires a force of 21,370 
agents, but a report recently said that as of May there were only 19,500 agents. 
Compounding the problem is retention: between 2013 and 2016 an average of 523 
agents were hired, while 904 left” (Moran, December 12, 2017, para. 14). 
Border wall security coverage creates zones—or lands divided by the struc-
ture that separates homeowners, universities, farmers, businesses and ranchers 
from their property. Heterotopias created by the power (Foucault, 1980) of the 
state are ostensibly designed to separate territories through land barriers on 
the border. In the instance of the Mexico-USA border in Texas, the Rio Grande is 
a natural barrier that is supplemented by emplacements (fences, walls, surveillance 
apparatuses) at times and places up to two miles or more inland. Most border 
structure follows levees designed to prevent flooding. As the river naturally curves 
and bends, the building of a wall directly on the banks is impractical. Foucault 
(1970) analyzes heterotopias as places that exist outside of the sacred and profane. 
Heterotopias are other places, such as prisons, amusement parks, museums, and 
walls, among other phenomena. 
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There is a strong fear, or a perception of fear (Correa-Cabrera & Garrett, 
2014) socially constructed of another 9-11-style terrorist attack with terrorists 
coming through the border with Mexico used to justify building an extensive secu-
rity apparatus for “illegal immigration”—although the 9-11 terrorists never came 
through the Mexico-USA border. Similarly, failure to produce or extend the wall 
would result in a loss of contracts for wall building by corporations (Garrett, 
2013). Politicians raise the fear of levee failure à la New Orleans along the Rio 
Grande as the levees were built under similar engineering designs (Garrett & Stor-
beck, 2011), and a fear of separation of culture and society by the authoritarian 
State. There would be a corresponding loss of commercial and social transactions 
with neighbors and customers from Mexico leading to economic calamity. Addi-
tionally, the border wall increases the potential for criminal activity by transna-
tional criminal organizations (TCOs) along the border, especially on the Mexican 
side (Correa-Cabrera & Garrett, 2014; Dunn, 2001). 
Berger and Luckmann (1980) and Schutz (1967) note that reality is socially 
constructed and not separate and outside of what people experience. Questions 
arise as to whether experiences from people dwelling outside of the Mexico-USA 
border region have any bearing of empathy or appreciation towards people living 
in the area. Social constructions and their variation matter.  
The ability to have any capacity for fellow citizens or neighbors in other 
states (within the USA) and countries starts with basic perceptions. Merleau-Ponty 
(1948/2008, 1962/2009, 1964) submits that perception precedes all application of 
“science” or other rational behaviors in terms of knowledge accumulation and 
how people come to experience, application of science and practice. What one 
knows through first-hand experience living on the border is different from others 
living farther inland, for example, and how they perceive the border wall or border 
security. 
Further philosophical inquiry into the social construction of lived experienc-
es—or what amounts to potential lived experiences—is in order. At this point, we 
have examined the social construction of images used to forward political agendas 
ostensibly designed to prevent another 9-11 or mitigate natural disaster. Foucault 
(1970) offers the following analysis of perceived ideals of reality that is relevant 
to the assessment of the border “wall”: 
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is neverthe-
less a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up 
cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, 
even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, proba-
bly because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible 
to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because 
they destroy “syntax” in advance, and not only the syntax which causes words 
and things (next to and also opposite one another) to “hold together.” This is 
why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the very grain of lan-
guage and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias […]  
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desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of 
grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our 
sentences (p. xviii, italics in original).  
As such, DHS—through President Trump— proposes the wall …  
[…] as a means to bring about an end to fears of potential terrorism—at least 
through the border with Mexico—and an end to illegal immigration. These pro-
posed policies constitute a utopian ideal, primarily from senior executive gov-
ernment officials who do not dwell along the US-Mexican border and therefore 
lack any experience with the local reality. American citizens living in the Rio 
Grande Valley are affected by the border “wall” and see the possibility of a hid-
eous structure ruining the aesthetical value of the area, destroying long-
cherished personal and friendly relations with their neighbors in Mexico, and the 
potential destruction of the ecological system important for quality of life and 
eco-tourism. What was first described as the neighborly “fence” in 2007–2009 is 
now to be foisted upon the residents of the Rio Grande Valley having become 
the “wall; designed to cut off families, culture, and history of good will between 
friends on both sides of the river.” [The border “wall” becomes “the other place” 
—the heterotopia for them.] There is no hope of a reprieve [given prior experi-
ence with the wall building of 2007–2009 and the current] political climate” […] 
[of now Trump’s wall.]1 (Garrett, 2010, p. 311) 
Garrett (2010) wrote: “Since the border ‘wall’ is now seemingly a fait ac-
compli, people and their local government representatives have sought to make the 
most out of an untenable situation. The question remains as to whether those 
dwelling in the heterotopia will be living in a dystopia—if the violence and chaos 
ensues from the construction of the border wall” (pp. 311–312). What was true in 
the previous decade is once again true in 2018. The hardship of the wall remains 
for the people of the lower Rio Grande Valley. So, while the border wall is central 
to CBP’s tripartite border security policy, the wall imposes hardships on the peo-
ple. The border wall is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981/2006; Garrett & Storbeck, 
2011). It is intended as a symbol for security but in reality for the border dwellers 
represents insecurity and exploitation. 
3. Trump’s border surge: More CBP, calling in the national 
guard and creating an impetus for more wall 
Candidate Donald J. Trump was supported by the National Border Patrol Council 
(NBPC) representing over 16,000 workers and the first federal employee union to 
endorse him (Katz, March 30, 2016). The NBPC national president, Brandon 
Judd, testified to the need for 5,000 more Border Patrol agents (Judd, March 22, 
                                                          
1 This section was written in 2010 and is updated to include material from 2018. Not much has changed 
with regard to the wall in nearly a decade, except the current executive leadership. 
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2017) and this was the number promoted by President Trump. Trump did not get 
5,000 new CBP approved, but “in total, the bill allocates $13.8 billion to customs 
and border protection. That includes the $1.6 billion for the wall, $100 million to 
hire 500 more Border Patrol agents, $131 million for new border technology, $106 
million for aircraft and sensors and $109 million for ‘non-intrusive inspection 
equipment’” (Ellis, July 11, 2017, para. 9). Congress scaled back the president’s 
request for more border personnel in 2018. 
President Trump lamented that he lost his campaign issue to keep undocu-
mented border crossers out of the USA to “seal” the border due to the passage of 
the Fiscal Year 2018 budget negotiations with Congress and not getting his full 
wall funded, thereby calling for a National Guard troop surge to protect the border 
with Mexico (Watson, April 7, 2018). Trump had vowed as a presidential candi-
date to keep illegal migrants out of the USA and to get Mexico to pay for the bor-
der but failed in this quest during the fiscal year 2018 budget negotiation with 
Congress, getting “$1.6 billion to pay for six months of work on his wall. He had 
asked for $25 billion for it” and “’We’re looking from 2,000 to 4,000 [National 
Guard troops] and probably keep them, or [...] a large portion of them, until such 
time as we get the wall.’” (Mason, April 5, 2018, para. 5, 7). The border surge of 
National Guard troops on the USA-Mexico border is underway. Part of the expla-
nation of the border construction and troop surge is political theater for the 
maintenance of political power.  
4. CBP’s Panopticon 
CBP has numerous tools available to it to control populations attempting to cross 
the Mexico-USA border—whether legally or illegally. Technological devices such 
as tethered aerostat radar systems (TARS) (CBP, February 17, 2017) unmanned 
predator B aerial (drone) aircraft systems (CBP, October 14, 2015), surveillance 
towers (mobile and fixed assets) and tactical communications (DHS, n.d.), motion 
sensors, and other apparatuses are employed for controlling who enters the USA 
from its southwestern border. The result of these surveillance tools gives CBP the 
ability to monitor migrants and other border crossers into the USA from Mexico. 
This overall capability results in a panopticon—the concept of surveillance for 
control of a given population. Jeremy Bentham’s (1787/1995) rationale for the 
panopticon begins as …. 
No matter how different, or even opposite the purpose: whether it be that of pun-
ishing the incorrigible, guarding the insane, reforming the vicious, confining the 
suspected, employing the idle, maintaining the helpless, curing the sick, instruct-
ing the willing in any branch of industry, or training the rising race in the path of 
education: in a word, whether it be applied to the purposes of perpetual prisons 
in the room of death, or prisons of confinement before trial, or houses of correc-
tion, or work-houses, or manufactories, or mad-houses, or hospitals, or schools. 
[…] It is obvious that, in all these instances, the more constantly the persons to 
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be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the 
more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been attained. (1995, 
p. 34, italics in the original) 
The object of CBP’s panopticon reflects the effects Bentham’s conceptual 
framework. Other theoretical explanations since Bentham are categorized and 
employed for further analysis of the panopticon (Galic et al., 2017). A few of 
those theories will be utilized in understanding and explaining CBP’s panopticon. 
In his discussion of Bentham, Foucault (1977) further elaborated about the 
question of observation, or surveillance, by noting that “[…] the Panopticon […] 
could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, alter behavior, to train or 
correct individuals […] [and is] a privileged place for experiments on men […] 
[functioning] as a kind of laboratory of power” (pp. 203–204). In the context of 
today’s CBP, the panopticon is an instrument of power wielded on migrants, drug 
and human traffickers, attempting to come into the USA. The panopticon—
combining Bentham’s prison design and developed further by Foucault for power 
and social control—acts as an apparatus for “an agent in power [who] has the 
ability to watch others without their knowledge and can do so without the risk that 
the others will watch back, creating docile bodies” (Newell et al., 2017, p. 24). 
The panopticon employed by the CBP is a key component to the ongoing 
“low intensity conflict” that relies on surveillance technology in Central America 
and Mexico (Nevins & Dunn, 2008, p. 23). Arteaga (2009) notes that the Merida 
Initiative, a new border security configuration agreement between the USA, Mexi-
co and Central America, endorsing “technologies to improved and secure commu-
nications systems to support collecting information as well as ensuring that vital 
information is accessible for criminal law enforcement” with “helicopters 
and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities” (p. 107). The initiative 
places Latin American countries under systematic surveillance by intelligence 
agencies of the USA. In addition to CBP and military personnel (e.g. National 
Guard troops), “vigilant citizens” may also get involved in a “virtual border watch 
program” to aid those authorities in intercepting border crossers (Koskela, 2010). 
Bigo (2006, 2011) contends that the panopticon employed by the USA along the 
southwestern border is more appropriately described as a ban-opticon designed to 
use surveillance in order to profile and keep out migrants and others deemed un-
desirable… 
The notion of “ban” originates from international relations (IR) and critical secu-
rity studies and is on a parallel track with surveillance studies. The ban-opticon 
deconstructs some of the post-September 11 analysis as a “permanent state of 
emergency” or as a “generalized state of exception,” which reinstates the ques-
tion of who decides about the exception in the heart of the IR debate: who is 
sovereign, and who can legitimately name the public enemy. The ban-opticon 
dispositif is established in relation to a state of unease created by the United 
States and its allies. The United States has propagated the idea that there is 
a global “in-security”, which is attributed to the development of threats of mass 
destruction, thought to be derived from terrorist and other criminal organizations 
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and governments that support them. This has led the US to assert the need for 
a globalized security that would render national borders obsolete and pressure 
other international actors to collaborate. (Bigo, 2011, p. 47) 
Migrants especially, when approaching the Mexico-USA border, confront the 
ban-opticon and “stand at the threshold between two worlds” experiencing and 
“living one of the most intense, fragile and vulnerable moments” in their lives 
(Newell et al., 2017). As Boyce (2016) comments quoting a Border Patrol Chief 
that the US Border Patrol 90% surveillance effectiveness rate is “achievable as 
a strategic objective [through] […] more and more of the technology” (p. 258). 
Boyce further notes, “as a matter of policy, the United States maintains the ambi-
tion to detect, monitor, and control virtually all activity proximate to its land bor-
ders” that results in a continuous growth and expansion cycle for the panopticon 
(p. 258).  
5. The Border Patrol’s wall 
The border wall as part and parcel to the overall Mexico-USA tripartite security 
policy has problems in terms of providing adequate data by the U.S. Governmen-
tal Accountability Office (GAO). Between 2007–2015 CBP spent approximately 
$2.3 billion to build the wall along the Southwest border (February 16, 2017, 
p. 41). According to the GAO, “Border Patrol headquarters and sector officials 
told GAO that Border Patrol lacks adequate guidance for identifying, funding, and 
deploying TI (tactical infrastructure) needs” as part of the Requirements Manage-
ment Process (p. 2). The GAO Report found that … 
[…] CBP has not developed metrics that systematically use these, among other 
data it collects, to assess the contributions of border fencing to its mission. For 
example, CBP could potentially use these data to determine the extent to which 
border fencing diverts illegal entrants into more rural and remote environments, 
and border fencing’s impact, if any, on apprehension rates over time. Develop-
ing metrics to assess the contributions of fencing to border security operations 
could better position CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best in-
formation available to inform competing mission priorities and investment. 
(p. 1) 
Despite the report which put the CBP to the task of trying to define the role 
of border infrastructure played in the overall security policy, the agency has yet to 
establish its measurable effectiveness, whether the fence (or wall) was effective in 
terms of resource allocation was not determined by February 2017. Replying to 
Ranking Member, Senator Claire McCaskill, on April 4, 2017 before the U.S. 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), for-
mer Acting Commissioner of CBP, David Aguilar, testified that the priority in 
2017 was (1) technology; (2) more CBP personnel; and, (3) border wall and other 
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infrastructure. The Senator asked Mr. Aguilar why he changed his testimony from 
previous visits to the HSGAC while he was Acting Commissioner from (1) border 
wall and other infrastructure; (2) more CBP personnel; and, (3) technology. 
Mr. Aguilar replied that priorities have changed as have the times and circum-
stances. However, Mr. Aguilar at the time of his testimony was working as a prin-
cipal for Global Security and Innovative Strategies (GSIS) and “currently serves 
on the Board of Directors for CZ-USA and Drone Aviation as well as the Adviso-
ry Boards of AT&T First Net and the Border Security Expo” (GSIS, n.d., para. 3). 
Hence, after having spent 35 years as a federal law enforcement officer, Mr. Agui-
lar is now representing a security-related consulting and business advisory firm 
that provides technology to the CBP. 
The push for more border wall infrastructure is not exclusively limited to up-
per management and executives in CBP. As mentioned previously, one of the first 
public employee unions to go on the record for and support then-candidate Trump 
was the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), the union for CBP agents. Since 
the election of President Trump, who was supported by NBPC due in large part to 
his commitment of obtaining 5,000 more Border Patrol agents, the USA has in-
cluded 500 more in the FY 2018 budget (Garrett, 2018) with a pledge for more to 
come in the future. In return for Trump’s support, the NBPC website clearly 
demonstrates its support of the president. The NBPC leader, Brandon Judd, has 
indicated his support for President Trump’s wall and Trump has in turn tweeted 
his acknowledgement of Judd’s support (Chaitlin, January 27, 2018). As of May 
2018, Mr. Judd declared that the National Guard deployment brought about by 
President Trump to help with the surge of migrants was a “colossal waste of re-
sources” (Hennessy-Fisk, May 24, 2018). Politically, however, NBPC remains 
a strong supporter of President Trump’s border policies, including the border wall. 
Criticism of the border wall by CBP and Border Patrol agents is rare as most 
public statements, especially recently, show that DHS and its agencies want more 
of it (e.g. Nixon, March 22, 2018). Occasionally, leaders and line agents will 
speak up. Former CBP Commissioner, Mr. Ralph Basham, wrote (October 25, 
2011) “Building a physical fence along the entire border with Mexico was one of 
the dumbest ideas I heard when I was commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection. It is critical to recognize that fencing (even with barbed wire, electrifi-
cation, and possibly a moat filled with alligators) is not a solution, it is only a tool” 
(para. 1). Border Patrol agents do not put the border wall high on their list of pref-
erences for border security. Nixon (March 22, 2018) reports that DHS documents 
state “the Border Patrol identified what it called 902 “capability gaps,” or vulnera-
bilities, on the Southwest border […] [mentioning] a “fence” or “fencing” as 
a possible solution 34 times—less than 4 percent of the 902 vulnerabilities identi-
fied” (para. 6–7). On rare occasions, the overall effectiveness of the border wall is 
called into question by members of the Border Patrol in a public manner. Mr. 
Chris Cabrera, Vice President of the Rio Grande Valley Sector Border Patrol, 
noted that “We came with this 18-foot wall, and the very next day they had 19-
foot ladders […] [and] it got to the point where we had so many ladders at the 
station that they told us to stop bringing the ladders in. It was just insane the num-
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ber of ladders we had. Hundreds upon hundreds” (Hamilton, November 3, 2016, 
para. 2). Mr. Cabrera also stated “They get up over that wall in a hurry” (para. 22). 
The question of whether the border wall works as originally conceived and again 
proposed is open to debate. 
6. CBP, the Homo Sacer and the consequences of Zero 
Tolerance policy implementation: The role of Border Patrol 
in the security apparatus 
The central focus of CBP and BP may be captured and summed by examining 
their mission statements. CBP’s (n.d.) mission statement is “to safeguard Ameri-
ca’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials 
while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legit-
imate trade and travel” (para. 4). The U.S. Border Patrol’s mission states “The 
priority mission of the Border Patrol is preventing terrorists and terrorists weap-
ons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States” 
(para. 1). These statements are prominent on their respective websites and are 
listed first.  
Miguel Padilla, Border Patrol Chief for the Rio Grande Valley Sector, is 
promoting the new Zero Tolerance policy and said that “his agents had separated 
568 parents from children as young as 5 since the Zero Tolerance policy was an-
nounced on April 6” (Miller, June 16, 2018, para. 2). Additionally…  
In March 2017, Padilla’s agents apprehended only 646 parents and minor chil-
dren crossing the border. But the number began to creep back up. And by April 
of this year, when the Trump administration announced zero tolerance, the tally 
was over 6,000. 
Padilla said the new policy reinvigorated the 3,000 agents under his command, 
who he said were “very motivated to be able to do their jobs again.” 
He shrugged off criticism, including comparisons of Border Patrol facilities to 
concentration camps. 
“Really, our mission is border security,” said Padilla, whose unit is hiring more 
officers. “And I think now we have a policy that supports securing our borders”. 
(Miller, June 16, 2018, para. 20–23) 
There is little doubt concerning Chief Padilla’s commitment to and enthusi-
asm for the new Zero Tolerance border security policy. The new policy regarded 
as “the nuclear option in the effort to discourage immigrants from unlawfully 
entering the United States” (Davis & Shear, June 16, 2018, para. 1) has brought 
about international attention with migrant children being separated from their 
parents to bring about more border wall and more border security. 
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The United Nations condemned the USA government’s Zero Tolerance poli-
cy as “The Trump administration’s practice of separating children from migrant 
families entering the United States violates their rights and international law” and 
the “practice ‘amounts to arbitrary and unlawful interference in family life, and is 
a serious violation of the rights of the child,’ Ravina Shamdasani, a spokeswoman 
for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, based 
in Geneva” (Cumming-Bruce, June 5, 2018, para. 1, 4). Migrants coming into the 
USA have lost most of their human rights which have previously been granted. 
Agamben (2005) made the case for the state of siege—or state of emergen-
cy—as a legal and policy means by which the George W. Bush administration had 
used the terrorist attacks to protect the USA from terrorists after the September 11, 
2001 attacks, invoking draconian surveillance measures and the border wall. The 
resulting changes began the erosion of civil rights and liberties for citizens. This 
was also expanded to include undocumented border crossers, the others—or homo 
sacer (Agamben, 1995), along with potential terrorists and the need for more 
border security, particularly along the Mexico-USA border (Garrett, 2018; Garrett 
& Storbeck, 2011; Pope & Garrett, 2012). The other target of the border wall are 
the USA citizens who live within 100 miles of the border (Garrett, 2012; Garrett 
& Storbeck, 2011). The homo sacer concept, while applied previously to all un-
documented border crossers, has taken on additional meaning with the Zero Toler-
ance policy of 2018. Families fleeing from Central American countries due to 
violence and other calamities who seek asylum under USA and international law 
are being systematically denied their human rights. The CBP, BP, Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and other law enforcement agencies working with the Trump ad-
ministration have designed a scheme to prevent these asylum seekers and other 
migrants from legally entering the USA at the international checkpoints systemati-
cally violating USA and international law (Nathan, June 16, 2018), forcing these 
people who have lost their rights and status, homo sacer, to attempt dangerous 
crossings of the Rio Grande only to be captured and arrested by BP (cf. Figure 1 
below and Appendix 1). The state of siege scenario manufactured by CBP and 
Border Patrol—integral components of the border security apparatus—is on full 
display with the implementation by the border bureaucrats of the Zero Tolerance 
policy. The political spectacle of the policy is exhibited. 
In addition to the legal dimensions and human rights violations, the media 
spectacle (Garrett, 2018; Kellner, 2003, 2016) promoted by social media, Twitter 
especially, enables President Trump to circumvent traditional media and attempt 
to speak directly to the citizens of the USA. There is a horrific spectacle of chil-
dren being separated at the border by Border Patrol and other DHS agencies. All 
media in 2018 are attuned to this ongoing policy disaster. 
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Rio Grande—Int’l Border 
Int’l Bridge 
X—migrant family captured 
by Border Control 
—migrant family intercept 
by CBP* 
 
(1) Migrant family first attempts to cross the international checkpoint and make an asylum 
claim… 
 
(2) Migrant family is forced to cross the Rio Grande 
 
 
          
 
 
 
* The migrant family, after being stopped by Custom Border Protection (CBP) agents, is forced to return into Mexico, thereby causing 
them to take the risk of crossing the Rio Grande—not at a checkpoint, resulting in a violation of 1911. 8 U.S.C. 1325—Unlawful entry, 
failure to depart, fleeing immigration checkpoints, marriage fraud, commercial enterprise fraud (civil penalty) (link: https:// 
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1911-8-usc-1325-unlawful-entry-failure-depart-fleeing-immigration). 
 
(3) The migrant family is then placed for approximately 48 hours in the hielera (ice box [or cooler] 
set at approximately 62 degrees Fahrenheit/17.8 degrees Celsius) (cf. also, Riva [2017] for 
a more extensive analysis of the effects of hieleras) and oftentimes the migrants are wet and 
cold. Afterwards, the migrant family unit is separated based on age and gender. This is where 
children are taken away from their parents. 
 
 Hielera  Child separation (options)   US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
                                                        Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) 
                                                        Southwest Key (or other private corporate vendors) 
 Adults sent to the detention center   Perrera (dog kennel)   ICE takes over from CBP 
 
(4) Adult migrants are sent to federal courts as soon as possible (the goal is 48 hours) or to an 
Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detention Center. Migrants appear before a federal 
magistrate in numbers ranging from 20 to over 100 after having spent a few minutes with 
a court appointed defense attorney. They’re generally charged with violations of the “1325” un-
lawful entry law unless there were other violations at the time of arrest. Eventually, they receive 
their sentence after pleading guilty, given credit for time served at the hierlera and perrera, then 
deported back to their country of origin (e.g. Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), oftentimes 
without their children. Children have lost contact with their parents and have to stay months un-
til they’re eventually sent back to their country of origin or sent to foster care designated by HHS 
and ORR. (Cf. Appendix 1 for further explanation of the Zero Tolerance policy) 
Note. Adapted from the Texas American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Presentation 6/13/2018 
at the Brownsville, Texas United Way Center. 
Figure 1. Zero Tolerance Policy Implemented by the Department of Justice and DHS, 
April 6, 2018: What It Means at the Southwest Border in Texas 
The tripartite border security policy as articulated on April 4, 2017 by former 
CBP Commissioner, Mr. David Aguilar, is fully exhibited by the Zero Tolerance 
policy that may have effectively “officially” ended June 20, 2018 by President 
Trump’s executive order titled “Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address 
Family Separation” due to political pressure by national and international groups 
and some of the media, although there is confusion as to whether it is in force … 
Mexico 
USA 
X 
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Though the Trump administration outwardly is maintaining that it is continuing 
its “zero-tolerance” border policy, email traffic obtained by CNN shows that the 
policy has effectively been curtailed for now—the latest sign of confusion and 
disarray over how to implement an executive order designed to halt family sepa-
rations at the border. 
The decision by Customs and Border Protection to put a hold on referring adults 
caught crossing the border illegally if they arrive with their children comes after 
President Donald Trump signed an executive order asking his agencies to keep 
families together at the border—though it did not order a halt to prosecutions. 
(Kopan, June 21, 2018) 
While the Zero Tolerance was in place, the tripartite security apparatus was 
in full view. CBP blocked the international bridges and Border Patrol (boots on 
the ground) used the wall (simulacrum) and surveillance (the panopticon) to chan-
nel undocumented migrants (homo sacer) to areas across the Rio Grande to be 
arrested, convicted, and housed in for-profit and government prisons. All of this 
was done, captured by the media, and may be explained by the overall milieu that 
is central to the society of the spectacle (Debord, 1967, 1995). 
7. Summary and post case study analysis: Implications of 
Custom and Border Protection’s Tripartite Border Security 
Policy for the Mexico–USA Border 
This paper began with an examination of the social construction of reality as to 
whether the effects of President Trump’s implied policy positions impacted the 
perception of people dwelling along the Mexico-USA border in a utopian or het-
erotopian manner. In the areas of the environment and ecotourism, property rights 
and eminent domain, most are coping with the perceived attacks and crises ema-
nating from the White House. People who care about their homes are fearful that 
they will be destroyed by the border wall. Border dwellers are facing a crisis based 
on the state of exception (Agamben, 2005)—the USA is under a state of siege—
which is used as a justification and that appears to them to be completely unneces-
sary for security. Landowners are fearful of more border walls being constructed 
and not receiving just compensation—not only in terms of remuneration, but loss 
of properties that have been in some families for generations.  
Far from being utopias, the towns and cities along the Mexico-USA border 
provide a sense of community that the people dwelling in the region have enjoyed 
for many years. The border wall strips people of their livelihoods and dignity and 
represents an affront to them as USA citizens. Corporations eager to build Presi-
dent Trump’s wall do not care about the borderlands other than whatever profits 
they may obtain. Walls create heterotopias—no man’s land between the where the 
walls are built and the actual border—the Rio Grande in Texas (Garrett, 2012; 
Garrett & Storbeck, 2011). Previously what occurred in the construction of the 
 AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. CUSTOM AND… 103 
border wall is that profits are made without regard for the people. Security is not 
the issue as most analysts conclude that the wall is unnecessary and other means— 
such as technology and more personnel—are far more beneficial. As the former 
governor of Arizona and former DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano stated in 2005 
about border walls “You show me a 50-foot wall and I’ll show you a 51-foot lad-
der at the border […] That’s the way the border works” (Garrett, 2018; Lacy, July 
19, 2011, para. 5). Communities along the Mexico-USA border will have the 
additional experience of extra border wall—with all the security-apparatus accou-
trement included: invasive surveillance technology and a larger BP presence. 
DHS, its constituent agencies—CBP and Border Patrol—as well as President 
Trump will continue to press their bureaucratically and politically-induced claims 
for the necessity of the border wall—thoughtlessly over the objections of the peo-
ple who have much to lose, in an economically disadvantaged region of the United 
States. Trump blames Democrats for the Zero Tolerance policy devised by the 
DOJ and the DHS and implemented during his administration, despite the fact that 
it is occurring on his presidential watch (Davis, June 16, 2018) as he tweeted… 
The Democrats are forcing the breakup of families at the Border with their hor-
rible and cruel legislative agenda. Any Immigration Bill MUST HAVE full 
funding for the Wall, end Catch & Release, Visa Lottery and Chain, and go to 
Merit Based Immigration. Go for it! WIN! (10:08 AM, 15 Jun 2018) 
The mis-perception of border violence (Correa-Cabrera & Garrett, 2014) will 
have its “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005; Garrett & Storbeck, 2011) narrative 
heard through the media by the federal government and from President Trump, for 
public consumption. DHS and CBP will be supported in their promotion of the 
border wall, increased growth of surveillance technology, and more CBP and 
Border Patrol personnel by the iron triangle of members of respective legislative 
committees and corporate interests—as well as President Trump. Building the big, 
beautiful border wall, more boots on the ground, and more being spent on the 
DHS panopticon, are all manufactured under the guise of border security, although 
building the border security apparatus will have continued deleterious policy con-
sequences for homo sacer—dwellers living in the borderlands and migrants seek-
ing asylum from Central America. Thousands of children remain separated from 
their parents—and are unaccounted for by the security apparatus—due to Trump’s 
Zero Tolerance policy (Shear et al., June 20, 2018). 
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Appendix 1. 
The effects of the USA DHS/CBP Border Security Apparatus for the Zero 
Tolerance policy: Photo examples and court hearing assessment 
(by the author) 
 
 
 
Picture 1. Step 1: CBP officers turning back Guatemalan migrants seeking asylum at the 
Paso del Norte Bridge in El Paso, Texas before crossing into USA territory (middle 
of the Rio Grande) – June 2, 2018 
Note. Adapted from “Border agents are using a new weapon against asylum seekers: Federal law allows immigrants to 
step into United States and claim asylum; agents are physically preventing them from doing so,” by R. Moore, 2018, 
June 2, Texas Tribune.  
110 TERENCE M. GARRETT  
 
Picture 2. Step 2: Migrants unable to cross the bridge to seek asylum, move off the bridge 
into other areas along the Rio Grande and are apprehended by Border Patrol 
agents using surveillance technology. 
Note. Adapted from “Immigrants who illegally crossed the Mexico-U.S. border are apprehended by the U.S. border 
patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector, near McAllen, Texas,” by L. Elliott, 2018, April 5, Reuters. 
Step 3:  After apprehension and being placed in hieleras and perreras. Adults and children 
(if accompanying with parents) are separated, with the adults sent to a judicial hearing by 
the U.S. Border Patrol in Federal District courts along the border and are charged and admit 
to guilt for the misdemeanor charge of illegally entering the USA. Below is one example: 
a copy of an assessment of the court proceedings of 48 migrant defendants by the author 
as reported to the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas. 
US District Court Southern District of Texas, Judge Ignacio 
Torteya III, Hearing of 6/18/2018, Brownsville, Texas 
 
My observations 
This was my first time to observe the immigration hearing proceedings. Judge 
Torteya (a judicial magistrate) appeared to me to have divided the hearing in 
two—one for the 15 people involved in felony proceedings—including re-entry 
violations, migrant stash houses (human trafficking), etc., with two shackled mate-
rial witnesses ostensibly involved in the case against two of the defendants, 
Mr. Dominguez-Roblero and Mr. Cantellano, allegedly the proprietors of the mi-
grant stash house. I’ll call this “group 1.” The second “hearing” or stage of the 
proceedings involved the 48 migrants, apparently mostly from El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and Honduras who were alleged “1325” misdemeanor violators. I’ll refer 
to them as “group 2.” 
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I believe that the two “hearings” were put together on purpose and may be 
part of a pattern to use what happens to “group 1” as an intimidation tactic to 
influence and to cow “group 2.” The grouping of the two sets of defendants to-
gether seems highly irregular—if only because group 1 involved felony charges 
and group 2 involved misdemeanor charges. Group 2 was represented by 
Mr. Hector Garza who apparently had little time to consult with his “clients” as 
they all were allegedly intercepted crossing the Rio Grande from June 14–16, 
2018 in Hidalgo, Cameron, and (one from) Starr counties in Texas. Group 2 all 
held in the affirmative to every question posed by Judge Torteya and there was 
little dissent in the process other than what I observed. First, one of the 48 defend-
ants, a woman, was taken from the Hearing and it was unclear to me what the 
circumstances were for her removal. Second, defendant #1820—Mr. Francisco 
Sanchez-Lopez indicated that he had mental health problems that required medica-
tion and he had not used it in 5 years. Mr. Sanchez-Lopez was visibly having 
difficulty, yet, Judge Torteya proceeded onward with Mr. Sanchez-Lopez's even-
tual guilty plea. Third, I sat directly behind defendant #1829—Ms. Trinidad Oliva, 
who was clutching a copy of the “Next Steps for Families” paper apparently given 
to her by someone in the Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Oliva was in 
tears when Judge Torteya asked her whether she received such information from 
Border Patrol. Ms. Oliva indicated to the judge she wanted her daughter back 
(Ms. Oliva was one of 12 of the 48 defendants present at the Hearing who had her 
child-in this case, her daughter-taken away by Border Patrol). And finally, defend-
ant #1804—Mr. Omar Jose Ruiz-Fuentes after everyone affirmed they were guilty 
of the “1325” misdemeanor charge said that he was seeking asylum because going 
back to El Salvador “meant death” for him. 
All of the defendants pled guilty and all were sentenced to a small fine and 
were given credit for time served in detention. All defendants were to be deported 
as soon as possible back to their country of origin. 
After the hearing adjourned, I was left wondering why these Group 2 defend-
ants had such lousy and superficial legal defense. It appeared that Mr. Garza was 
part and parcel to a system of “false” justice whereby the entire system was rigged 
against these migrant-defendants in order to facilitate their exit from the USA. If 
there were an adequate defense for any and/or all of them, why weren't they be 
advised to say “not guilty” based on circumstances? Were some of them turned 
back by Customs and Border Protection from crossing the bridges in Reyno-
sa/Hidalgo and/or Brownsville/Matamoros, thus causing them not to abide by the 
provisions of the US Code Title 8 “1325” law? This seems like a logical or rea-
sonable defense given what some of these people have gone through to get to the 
USA-Mexico border. Aren’t there other circumstances that if brought before a trial 
jury would have been useful in their defense? I think the entire system is a sham 
and a disgrace to civil rights and liberties the USA is supposed to be founded 
upon. 
